



"To care for him who has borne the battle, and for his widow and orphans."

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GENL. O. O. HOWARD'S

Personal Reminiscences of the War of the Rebellion.

THE SECOND BULL RUN, And the Military Maneuvers That Led Up to It.

WHERE KEARNEY FELL.

The Battle of Chantilly Terminates Pope's Campaign.

By Major-General O. O. Howard, U. S. A.

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XVII.—Continued.

Lee's next move told the lesson, but it came too late for remission. Stuart, entering in midday, swept around our right flank, and touched Calvert's Station at night. He did not effect much damage, except the taking of about 300 prisoners and some of the baggage and dispatches of General Pope. Stuart returned as he came, carrying the detail of our plans to Lee, who quickly saw that he must hasten operations to effect anything before a complete junction of our two armies took place. Certainly Lee's plan was the boldest, and like that of General Grant at Vicksburg, had, *prima facie*, but few reasons in its favor. "Jackson was directed on the 25th of August to cross the Rappahannock above Waterloo and move around the enemy's right, so as to strike the Alexandria and Orange Railroad in his rear. Longstreet, in the meantime, was to divert his attention by threatening him in front, and to follow Jackson as soon as the latter should be sufficiently advanced." The movement was made with the utmost rapidity. Stuart worked his way to Gainesville, keeping the eyes of our cavalry upon himself. Jackson's hastening columns were covered by the Bull Run range. He was at Salem the first night, and bursting through Thoroughfare Gap, following Stuart en route, he appeared on our railroad at Brimstone Station just after sunset of the next day. Without regard to the weakness of his troops, he pushed Trimble's brigade and a part of Stuart's cavalry, all under Stuart, up the railroad—ten miles—that night to seize our depot at Manassas Junction. Very early the next morning Jackson himself appeared there on the scene, having left Ewell's division and a regiment of cavalry behind at Brimstone to watch us. Of course, our small guard was captured. Abundance of artillery, small arms, ammunition, and quantities of supplies fell into Jackson's hands.

FEBRUARY ENCOUNTERS.

Colonel Sumner, with two regiments—11th and 24th Ohio—being near Union Mills, and hearing that the enemy was at Manassas, hurried his command thitherward. The enemy met him, and after a sharp skirmish, drove him back across Bull Run, and a part of Stuart's force continued its march even to Burke's Station. The same day Franklin sent out from Alexandria, Taylor's New Jersey brigade of four regiments. Uniting with Sumner, Taylor gave battle to Jackson's advance. He, also, was defeated and driven back beyond Union Mills, losing a leg in this encounter.

While Jackson delayed at Manassas, feasting on his captured stores and destroying what he could not carry away, his rear-guard, under Ewell, was not having so nice a time. For Heintzelman, commanding Hooker's and Kearney's divisions, having passed Manassas before the enemy's arrival, had been, the evening of the 25th, dumped down with troops and baggage at Warrenton Junction. Porter's corps, too, (two divisions, under Morell and Sykes) was at the same time approaching from Aquia Creek. Heintzelman had about 10,000, and Porter in the neighborhood of 9,000 effective. The instant General Pope found the enemy upon his communications he turned back with his whole force, including Heintzelman's corps, direct—the left, under McDowell, to Gainesville, and his center, under Heintzelman, to Gainesville, a point a few miles to the south of Gainesville, while he himself moved with the right, under General Hooker, to reopen his communications with Washington. Sigel and Reynolds were temporarily added to McDowell's command. Reno replaced Hooker with Heintzelman.

The afternoon of the 27th, Hooker moving eastward, came upon Ewell's division and his cavalry, near Brimstone Station. These veteran troops—veterans on both sides—had a sharp encounter. Ewell was speedily driven back with a loss of about 300 men and some of his material. He burned the bridge behind him and broke up much of the track. While we were repairing the crossing of Broad Run, Ewell sped on rapidly, and rejoined Jackson at Manassas Junction.

At this time—the evening of the 27th of August—though there was confusion and mistakes among subordinate commanders, and some struggling, also a shortage of supplies,—both food and ammunition,—and doubts the fever of anxiety at Washington was at its height, still, matters could hardly have been better for General Pope. McDowell being at Gainesville, with a division further westward, stopping at Thoroughfare Gap, and all the other troops well in hand and in supporting distance, with a reserve under Porter of troops as weary than the rest, there was good ground for the hope that Jackson and Longstreet were well assunder, and that Pope, with at least 50,000 men, might fall upon Jackson, who could not muster all told more than 30,000 effective.

ANOTHER CHANGE OF PLANS.

General Pope's sanguine heart had already leaped with exultant joy as he thus saw the problem solved and Jackson crushed. But— presto! change! By the information brought him the night of the 27th, it was demonstrated that part of Jackson's force, under A. P. Hill, was in motion toward Centerville, and Stuart's advance had moved from Burke's Station to Fairfax Court-House, and thence trotted along the turnpikes westward. True, Jackson was still at Manassas Junction, but what was plainer was that he was afraid of his adversary, so much re-enforced, and would make off by speedy marching to Aldie, via Centerville, past the mountains at the Aldie Gap, and so join Longstreet in the valley behind them. This misconception of Jackson's purpose—a purpose which every movement towards Centerville

was intended by him to conceal—caused Pope to issue a new set of orders—just the orders, in truth, which should have been given to overtake Jackson, and force him to battle before he could accomplish the proposed march.

However, Jackson, with his main body, be it large or small, found his way quite directly to a strong position, several miles west of Centerville, and slightly to the north of the Little hamlet of Groveton. He placed his command behind an unused railroad cut, facing southward, while his left stretched toward our old crossing of Bull Run at Sully's Springs. How easy for Confederate Hill and Stuart to dilly-dally in the neighborhood of Centerville, till our forces, rushing thence by the way of Manassas, should touch their outposts, then quickly withdraw via Cub Run and the upper crossings of Bull Run, and close in on Jackson's left as posted.

For on the 28th, McDowell from Gainesville, Reno from Greenwich, and Porter from Brimstone, moved toward Manassas. Kearney, sent to Manassas by the way of Brimstone, by his great energy outstripped the other divisions. It seems that Pope did not know that one division of McDowell was so far away at Thoroughfare Gap. It was too late to remove it, but the new orders and the Centerville movement demanded its recall. This at once removed every obstacle between Jackson and Longstreet, now not more than nine or ten miles apart. Kearney pushed rapidly after Hill, and skirmished with his rear-guard in Centerville, as Hill drew off by the roads we have named to Jackson. During the march of this day, King's division, coming eastward along the Warrenton pike, just at evening, encountered a heavy force—Ewell's and Taliaferro's divisions. It was a sharp engagement, ending with the night. Gibbons's brigade, supported by Doubleday's, resisted their assaults with persistence. There was considerable loss on each side in this conflict. Ewell and Taliaferro were badly wounded, the former losing a leg. King remained two hours after the fight, and then drew back to Manassas. The end of this day found Pope with his headquarters at Centerville. He now saw that he had misinterpreted Jackson's purposes, and, being positive of his whereabouts, quickly turned all his troops in his direction.

Ricketts retreated to Brimstone Station, and at last came to Manassas, so that to get back from Centerville, Manassas, and wherever else, the night of the 28th had found the hurrying troops of Pope, caused indeed much marching and countermarching. Many were discouraged, for they were short of food and powder, and weary with movements from place to place which they did not comprehend.

A DRAWN BATTLE.

The morning of the 29th, while Heintzelman, with Hooker and Kearney and Reno, was coming from Centerville toward Gainesville, Sigel, being on the Sudley road south of Groveton, was faced northward and pushed forward, supported by Reynolds's division, to engage Jackson as well as he could and keep him employed. Porter and McDowell, having Porter's corps with King's and Ricketts's divisions, were directed to the left of Sigel toward Gainesville. General Sigel deployed his troops and moved forward steadily as early as 6 o'clock. This wonderful fight was prolonged by the divisions of Schurz, Schenck, Milroy and Reynolds pressing back the enemy's advance till near mid-day, when Kearney arrived. By 2 o'clock Hooker and Reno were also on the ground. General Pope was present and reorganized the battle front, with Kearney on the right and Reynolds on the left, and Hooker and Reno at the center. There was irregular skirmishing on both sides till about 4:30, when a desperate engagement was entered upon. Kearney and Hooker succeeded in pressing back Jackson's left, and at times it appeared as though the railway crossing would be held by our persistent charges. As soon as McDowell and Porter, aiming toward Gainesville, had touched the enemy's skirmish-line, McDowell, with King's and Ricketts's divisions, moved off to the right, with the express purpose of forming a junction with Pope. He left Porter to watch the enemy's right flank. King's division came up to Reynolds's left in time to be severely engaged. Porter was undoubtedly expected by Pope to assail Jackson's right. However, Longstreet's command was on the spot, and in fact covered and protected Jackson's right. The enemy's advance, with reference to this flank, and the attack of General Porter with regard to them, have been the subject of prolonged controversies and military investigations, into which it is not now needful to enter. General Porter did not need a skirmish, assail Longstreet or Jackson that day, and this memorable 29th of August ended in a drawn battle after furious fighting and heavy losses.

THE SECOND DAY'S FIGHT.

During the night, from various circumstances which influence the mind of a commander, General Pope received the impression that the enemy was retreating; but, strange to tell, Lee and Pope both were preparing for the offensive. Porter's command was drawn in till it formed junction with the main line, and with his troops and Ricketts's went into battle with the rest. Our forces, thus concentrated, carried on the action and fought desperately, yet to little purpose, for Longstreet and Stuart far outanked us on our left, and pressed us back—back to that old ground where the hottest fighting had been at our first Bull Run. This time there was no panic. There was a constant changing of front; our best troops held the woods and ravines, and knolls, and buildings with unbroken tenacity. The heavy roar and the sharp rattle of musketry continued till dark. The greater portion of the field, covered with the dead, the dying, and the wounded, was, it is true, in the enemy's hands, yet our lines were not broken, and the Warrenton pike was still fully in Pope's possession.

During the darkness of the night General Pope slowly and carefully drew back his command beyond Bull Run to the heights of Centerville.

On the afternoon of August 29 I visited General Halleck in Washington. I went to his private dwelling. The servant who met me at the door said the general was asleep. I signified that I would wait till his nap was over, as I much desired to meet him.

In about half an hour he appeared at an inner door of the room, stood in the doorway, and, looking at me sternly, as if I had committed some offense, said: "Do you want to see me officially, sir?" Being taken aback by this unexpected manner, I stammered, "Yes, sir; what is it?" I replied in substance: "I've been on fire with my wound since Fair Oaks, and wish to report my return to duty and

(Continued on 3th page.)

SAVING THE NATION.

The Story of the War Retold for Our Boys and Girls.

PITTSBURG LANDING.

And How a Battle Came to be Fought There.

THE TWO DAYS' FIGHT.

A Confederate Victory Which Ended in a Rout.

By "Carleton."

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XIII.

To the Boys and Girls of the United States:

Open your way to the States of Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, and you will see a place on the Tennessee River about ten miles north of the Alabama line, called Pittsburg Landing. You notice two small streams coming in on the west side—Lick Creek, nearest the Alabama line, and Snake Creek, four miles below. If you walk through the woods three miles, you will come to Shiloh Meeting-house—without a steeple and bell, and built of logs. The mud which was chinked in between the logs has been washed out by the rains. It had a door once, but it is gone; the roof is leaky; but here in past days the people used to meet on Sundays—men and women riding in on horseback, tying their horses to the trees, sitting on the oak benches, listening to the preacher; eating their lunch at noon by a spring which gurgles from the ground in a hollow near by.

WHY A GREAT BATTLE WAS FOUGHT AT SHILOH.

I dare say that you wonder why a great battle happened to be fought at such an out-of-the-way place, but if you will study your map a moment you will see how it came about.

You have already followed the Union gunboats up to Florence in Alabama. The river was a highway by which the Union troops could get almost to the heart of the Confederacy. When Porter's division was captured, General Beauregard hurried from Richmond to gather an army to oppose General Grant. He saw that the Union troops would be likely to come up the river to Pittsburg Landing, march west twenty miles, and seize Corinth, where the railroad leading from Nashville to Memphis crosses that leading from Columbus to Mobile and from Memphis to Chattanooga. From Corinth they could march west and attack Memphis, and if they were to capture it the Confederates would be compelled to abandon the Mississippi between Memphis and Cairo.

General Beauregard seeing this, resolved to gather an army at Corinth. General Johnston, who had retreated from Bowling Green, Murfreesboro', put his troops into the cars and transported them thither. General Grant came from Mobile with 10,000 men. General Polk sent a portion of his troops. Governor Harris, of Tennessee, issued a proclamation, calling upon every able-bodied man to enlist, and in a very few days Johnston, who was Beauregard's superior, had an army of nearly 45,000. He expected General Van Dorn from Arkansas with nearly 20,000, but they had not come.

UNION PLANS.

"I think," said General Sherman to General Smith, "that troops ought to be posted at Pittsburg Landing."

He saw that it was the place for the troops to land preparatory to a movement upon Memphis. General Smith said to General Harbitt, under the name of General Johnston, on March 18th, to take possession of the place. General Sherman handed with his division the next day, marched out to seize the railroad leading to Columbus, and burnt the bridge over Snake Creek; he came near capturing a train of cars, then returned and pitched his tents around Shiloh Meeting-house. General Prentiss and General W. H. L. Wallace came with their divisions. General Lewis Wallace came to Crump's Landing, five miles farther down the river. In all there were 32,000 men. It was the Army of the Tennessee.

THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.

The troops of General Buell, composing the Army of the Cumberland, were on their way from Nashville. General Nelson's division was in advance. He heard that the Confederates were gathering at Corinth, and the thought came to him that probably Johnston, smarting under the loss of the evacuation of Nashville, instead of waiting to be attacked, would march to Shiloh and fall upon the Army of the Tennessee. He was brave and energetic, and was so impressed with the idea of what Johnston probably would do, that, while the engineers were constructing a bridge across Duck River, he found a fording place, crossed, and was a day in advance of the other divisions.

While the Army of the Cumberland was on the march, let us go from Shiloh to Corinth and see what Johnston and Beauregard are doing.

MOVEMENT OF JOHNSTON'S ARMY.

It is midnight, April 2. Scouts have been sent north of the Tennessee River, hovering around Buell's army. A courier comes with the intelligence that in three or four days Buell will join General Grant.

"The river, and seize his supplies."

That is the unanimous opinion of Johnston, Beauregard, Hardee, Bragg, Polk, and Breckinridge. Officers carried the orders, and on Thursday morning, April 3, the troops were on the march. They would be in position to strike a blow on Saturday morning. But it rained on Friday, and the artillery wheels sank in the mire. The roads were narrow, the men were weary. Friday night came, and the army was in no condition or position to strike the blow on Saturday.

General Johnston hoped to surprise the Union troops, but just at sunset Friday night the Confederate advance came upon the Union pickets. There was a skirmish. General Sherman sent out three regiments, and the skirmish almost became a battle.

General Lewis Wallace, who was down near Crump's Landing, north of Snake Creek, heard that there were Confederates in front of him and his troops were placed in line. On Saturday there was more skirmishing. The Union

officers and soldiers thought that the Confederates were making a reconnaissance, but very few, if any in the army, had a thought that on Sunday morning one of the great battles of the war was to be fought around the log meeting-house and in the forest between it and Pittsburg Landing.

SATURDAY NIGHT.

While the troops of the Union army are drying their clothes after the rain and telling stories by the camp-fires, let us see how the divisions are encamped.

We start from the landing, where there are forty or fifty steamers tied up. Men are rolling out barrels of sugar, bacon, pork, beef, boxes of bread, hales of hay, or carrying sacks of corn and oats. Wagons are loading and long trains winding up the river bank. Ascending the hill we come to the division commanded by W. H. L. Wallace. It was commanded by General Smith at Donelson. A half mile south is General Harbitt's division. Going toward the church we come to McClelland's division, facing west. Just beyond the church is Sherman's division, facing southwest. We see Prentiss's division to the left of Sherman's, also facing southwest, and at Prentiss's left a single brigade, under Stuart, on the bank of Lick Creek, about one mile from the river. The distance from where Stuart stands to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, is three miles. This is the only place where Johnston can attack, for the water is high in the Tennessee, and has flowed back into the creeks, which prevents him from attacking the Union army in flank.

General Grant knows that there is a great army at Corinth. On Thursday and Friday General Beauregard, with his brigade, had skirmishes at Mico's house, five miles out. The Confederate cavalry swooped down upon Buckland's picket-line and captured a lieutenant and seven men. Buckland did not like that. He pushed out two miles and came upon more cavalry and artillery. Major Crockett was killed, but Buckland captured ten men. He did not know that he was having a skirmish with Cleburne's brigade of Hardee's corps, advancing from Corinth.

Captain Mason, of the 77th Ohio, is out on picket Saturday morning. He sees squirrels and rabbits coming towards his line from the southwest as if suddenly startled from their haunts. He informs General Sherman, who sends out several companies to strengthen the pickets.

SATURDAY AFTERNOON.

General Prentiss sends Colonel Moore, with three companies of the 21st Missouri, to reconnoiter. They march obligingly past General Sherman's position, towards the west, three miles. They see nothing of the enemy. If they had marched southwest two miles, they would have come plump upon General Hardee's line.

All through Saturday General Lewis Wallace's men, north of Snake Creek, are under arms, for the pickets out on the Purdy road discover a large force of Confederates. Wallace does not know that General Cheatham moving south to get to position. General Sherman knows that over several miles there are Confederates, but he does not expect to be attacked. He writes a note Saturday evening to General Grant: "I have no doubt nothing will occur to-day more than picket firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our pickets."

General Grant did not expect to be attacked, for he sent this to General Halleck by telegraph Saturday afternoon: "I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place."

General Grant had not done what he learned to do later in the war—throw up intrenchments. The pickets were not out so far as they ought to have been. Experience is the great teacher, and the Union army was about to learn a lesson which was not forgotten during the war.

JOHNSTON'S LINES.

Walking now beyond the Union pickets, let us see the Confederate troops. They have no tents. It has been a weary march. They lie down upon the cold, damp ground, knowing that at daylight they are to strike a blow which they believe will drive the Union troops into the river.

There are four lines extending from Lick Creek to Owl Creek. The front line is composed of Hardee's corps, with Gladden's brigade on the right. The artillery is in front with the infantry behind.

Five hundred yards in rear of Hardee is Bragg's corps. Eight hundred yards in rear of Bragg's is General Polk. Behind all is Breckinridge with the reserve. In each line there are from ten to twelve thousand men.

No loud talking is allowed; no drums beat the tattoo; no bugle sounds out its blast.

It is 10 o'clock. The night is clear. In rear of the lines one dim fire burns. Around it stand the Confederate generals. They have come to receive their last orders. Beauregard is talking. He is restless, nervous, throws aside his cloak, walks here and there because he cannot keep still. General Breckinridge is lying upon the ground wrapped in his blanket, pale and thoughtful. A few moments ago he was Vice-President of the United States. In July he left his seat in the Senate, turned his back upon the Nation and upon his State to join the Confederacy. To-morrow he will be in the thick of the fight.

General Polk, no longer a preacher, sits upon a camp stool, leaning forward. His elbows upon his knees. He is silent and motionless.

General Bragg, whose battery did great execution at Buena Vista, in Mexico, is wide awake. He speaks with energy as to how the attack should be conducted.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, commander-in-chief, stands apart from the rest. He is tall. His shoulders are broad. His hair is tinged with gray. His life has been spent in the service of the United States. His face is pale. The wrinkles are coming in his cheeks. He has felt deep chagrin over his forced evacuation of Bowling Green and the disaster at Donelson and Nashville. To-morrow he will retrieve all. All listen when he speaks.

"Hammer them, gentlemen; hammer them," he says. He has but one plan—to let his troops upon Prentiss's and Sherman's divisions, drive them back upon McClelland, Harbitt and W. H. L. Wallace, and sweep them into the river or compel their surrender before Buell arrives.

"Gentlemen, we sleep in the enemy's camps to-morrow night."

It is not Johnston, but Beauregard who says it. All are confident of success, for spies have been through the Union lines and have reported the exact situation of the Union troops.

(Continued on 5th page.)

UP THE RED RIVER.

How the Famous Banks Expedition Came to Grief.

THE LINE OF RETREAT.

Building the Bracket Dam—The Work of Western Men.

YELLOW BAYOU FIGHT.

Some Interesting Letters from Survivors of the Expedition.

V.

The route of the troops composing General Banks' army on its retreat from Grand Ecore towards Alexandria led via the crossing of Bayou Coteau, at its mouth on Red River, thence to Henderson's Hill, by the Coteau road, which place was reached on the night of the 24th, and on the following day the column entered Alexandria.

"I press on to Alexandria," says Gen. Taylor. "The destruction of this country by the enemy exceeds anything in history. For many miles every dwelling-house, every negro cabin, every cotton-gin, corn-crib, and chicken-house has been burned to the ground."

General Franklin admits the commission of "acts of marauding and vandalism by stragglers in advance of the column," and adds that "every effort has been made and is being made to discover the perpetrators of these outrages, to whom the severest punishment will be awarded upon detection."

On arriving at Alexandria the troops were encamped in line of battle—the 19th corps on the right, the 13th corps in advance of the center, and the 16th and 17th corps on the left—where they remained until the 13th of May, the interim being occupied in getting the boats over the falls. An incident occurred on the 28th, which has furnished to the survivors of the 16th corps a good deal of amusement. Liddell's cavalry made a dash upon Cameron's command on that day and drove in the skirmishers. Cameron formed his line to receive the attack that he supposed was coming, when he received an order from General Banks to fall back upon the main line.

General A. J. Smith refers to it as follows: "On the 28th of April, the enemy having driven in the skirmishers of the 13th corps, the corps fell back reluctantly (in compliance, it is said, with orders from Major-General Banks, three times repeated), abandoning and setting on fire their camp and garrison equipment, stores, and forage. Not knowing that it was done by order, I took Shaw's brigade and put on the fire, rescued the stores, and saved the camp and garrison equipment. This brigade remained on the ground until the next morning, when it returned to camp."

And he might have added that Shaw's brigade came back to camp considerably better off than when it marched out.

There was nothing in the way of a speedy evacuation of Alexandria and a return of the troops to their several departments, except the low stage of water in Red River. The fleet, however, was as securely locked above the falls as though it was afloat in a lake. How to liberate it and set it on its way towards the Mississippi, was the question asked by Admiral Porter of the corps of engineers.

DAMNING THE RED RIVER.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Bailey, acting chief of engineers, called in council the commanders of two regiments of engineers of the corps of army—Colonel George D. Robinson and Lieutenant-Colonel U. S. Parsons—who advised the building of two dams, one at the foot of the upper and the other at the foot of the lower falls. In this opinion, Colonel D. P. Houston, chief engineer, Department of the Gulf, acceded. Colonel Bailey, however, decided that one at the foot of the lower falls would be sufficient, and on the morning of the 30th of April the work was commenced by the 9th and 99th U. S. colored infantry, known as the engineer brigade, commanded by Colonel Robinson. Next came the 29th Maine, under Lieutenant-Colonel Emerson, detachments from many of the regiments in the army followed, and the work went bravely on.

The force on the right bank consisted of the two colored regiments mentioned and a detail of four hundred men from Colonel Dickey's brigade of colored infantry. On the left bank were the 29th Maine, the Pioneer corps of the 13th army corps and details from various regiments.

Barges filled with stones were sunk, leaving a channel in the middle of the stream; cribs were built next the banks, having chutes through which, on the 5th of May, the water having risen to such an extent as to carry away two of the loaded barges, the gunboats Lexington, Fort Henderson, Neosho and Osage passed over the falls above the pond, and thence through the dam below in perfect safety. Owing to the accidental breaking of the dam, however, it was now decided to adopt the suggestions of Colonel Robinson and Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, and work was commenced upon light wing dams near the head of the falls to increase the depth of the water at that point. The new plan was commenced with commendable vigor, and on the 10th the temporary works, consisting of light cribs lashed together with ropes and filled with brush and bricks, raised about fourteen inches of water under the boats. The Chitticothe worked her way through while this work was in progress, and the Carondelet attempted to follow her, but owing to the rapidity of the current she was forced aside, and lay with her bow close below the end of the wing dam extending from the left bank, her stern down stream, and pointing diagonally across the channel. The Mound City, in making her way through the narrow space, grounded abreast of the Carondelet. Five more iron-cribs were still above them.

BUILDING THE "BRACKET DAM."

At this juncture Colonel Bailey, in company with General Banks, called on Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons, whose long experience in a similar avocation in civil life entitled his opinion to unusual weight, and asked what could be done to save the seven boats lying helpless in the stream.

He at once unfolded his plan, which was the

building of a "bracket dam." Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons asked for and obtained the Pioneer corps, numbering 125 men, under Captain Hutchins. They were picked men from the 11th, 24th, 34th, 46th, 47th and 67th Indiana, the 50th, 83d, 96th and 48th Ohio, the 24th and 38th Iowa, the 23d and 29th Wisconsin, the 19th Kentucky, and the 120th Illinois, "who," said Colonel Bailey, in his report, "to a man were invaluable."

To these hardy Western men, skilled in the use of tools as well as muskets, was the work of saving the most valuable portion of the iron-clad fleet intrusted.

Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons commenced operations by instructing the men in building two-legged trestles, which were all completed at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 11th. Iron bolts were set into the foot of the legs of each trestle, and one in the lap piece at the end, resting on the bottom, up stream. The place selected for the bracket dam was at a point opposite the lower end of the Carondelet, extending out close to this vessel from the left bank. A party of men selected and headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons in person, placed these trestles in position in swift-running water four and a half feet in depth. Several men were swept away, but no lives were lost. The trestles were fastened as soon as they were in position by driving the iron bolts down into the bottom of the river. When completed, plank was placed along the brackets on the upper side, and in four hours from the time the work was begun there was a foot of water under the Mound City and Carondelet.

Both vessels floated off easily before the ultimate height of water was obtained, followed by the remaining ironclads, and at noon on the following day were safe below the main dam at Alexandria.

An engineering feat such as that just described deserves to be embalmed in *THIS TRIBUNE*, and the surviving members of the organizations engaged in the work may well feel proud of their part in the enterprise.

OFF FOR THE MISSISSIPPI.

On the 13th of May, the boats having passed the falls, the line of march was taken up for the mouth of Red River, the cavalry in advance, the troops of the 13th and 10th corps following, and the 16th and 17th corps in their old position as the rear-guard of the army.

Continuing down the river as far as Fort De Russy, in order to be at hand to protect the line of march, the fort was reached on the night of the 14th. From this point the guards on the boats were considered sufficient to protect them, and they were, therefore, ordered to proceed to Simmesport, on the Atchafalaya Bayou, toward which point the land column was turned. The vicinity of Simmesport was reached on the 16th of May. Skirmishing had taken place all along the line of march, but no attack of sufficient importance to cause more than momentary halts of the column.

The fleet, having arrived, a bridge was built across the Atchafalaya, and the next three days were used by the 13th and 17th corps and the cavalry in crossing the bayou.

On the 18th, while the command of A. J. Smith was lying in line protecting the crossing of the other corps, his line was vigorously attacked. General Mower had received the laconic order from General Smith that if he was attacked he should drive the enemy back. This order could not have been given to an officer more likely to obey it, or to troops less likely to falter in carrying it out. General Smith was at the time at the landing, and General Mower at once moved upon the enemy with Hill's, Shaw's and Lynch's brigades. After skirmishing about two miles through a dense thicket, for the last half hour he came upon a heavy force on the opposite side of a field, which opened upon him with twelve rifled cannon. Mower had with him Timin's battery of rifled guns, with the 3d Indiana battery and four smooth-bore guns of the 9th Indiana battery near the left, with two regiments on the left of the guns for support. Taylor's force consisted of Polignac's division of infantry, three batteries of artillery, and Wharton's division of cavalry and mounted infantry. Polignac's troops were mostly stationed on the right of the Confederate line, opposite Lynch's brigade.

THE FIGHT AT YELLOW BAYOU.

The cavalry on Taylor's right made a desperate charge, driving the cavalry on the extreme left of Shaw's line back and getting in rear of his flank, necessitating change of front to the left by the regiments supporting the battery. Colonel Kinney, commanding Lynch's brigade, consisting of two 110th Illinois, 58th Illinois and 89th Indiana, says: "The 8th Indiana battery opened a heavy fire upon the enemy, but it was not long before the enemy got five range on our battery and put in several very close shots, which compelled us to change its position further to the left, when firing was renewed. We soon ascertained that our shots fell short, doing no great damage to the enemy. During this time, however, the enemy was steadily approaching, the skirmishing grew heavier, and the skirmish-line was being driven in. The enemy was advancing in overwhelming numbers. The order was given to fix bayonets and charge the enemy. In a moment the whole line was in motion at double-quick, meeting the advancing foe and pouring in a deadly fire. With cheer upon cheer we advanced. The enemy faltered, stopped, turned and fled before the glittering line of bayonets and galling fire of our men, who nobly pressed forward through the wood to the open field beyond. Here we halted, being too weak to press the charge further. I then discovered that an effort was being made to turn our left flank. I immediately changed the front of the 110th Illinois obliquely to the rear on first company, in order to protect the line. I then received the order to fall back, and, facing brigade by the rear rank, moved back in line of battle to the open field originally occupied by us. In checking the attempt to turn my left the 9th Indiana battery rendered great service, double-shooting her guns with canister. The 27th Iowa was ordered to its support and one section of the 3d Indiana battery also came to its assistance. All poured such a murderous fire into the ranks of the enemy that he was compelled to fall back in great disorder."

Twice the attack was renewed upon this gallant brigade of little over one thousand men and twice repulsed. Colonel Lynch arrived on the field during the first attack, but before he assumed command of his brigade was wounded and borne to the rear.

HILL'S FIGHT ON THE RIGHT.

Colonel Hill's brigade, consisting of the 33d Missouri, 35th Iowa, and detachments of the 11th Missouri and 8th and 12th Iowa, had its position on the right. [These detachments

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